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Abstract
The following paper analyses the sustainability of the Peruvian “Pay as You Go System” 
which is provided by the Government. In Peru, the “Pay as you Go System” coexists with 
Private Pension Funds or “Fully Funded Pension”. Sometimes both systems compete 
with each other with advantages and disadvantages between them. We found that 
“Pay as You Go System” cannot be sustainable over a long period of time. In addition, 
based on a comparative analysis of advantages and disadvantages, we propose some 
recommendations to make Private Pension Funds (Fully Funded Pension) the best 
alternative to Pay as You Go System.
Key words: 
Fully Funded, Pay as You Go, Sustainability.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la sostenibilidad del sistema pensional colectivo implementado 
por el gobierno peruano. En Perú, este sistema coexiste con el de fondos privados de 
pensiones o fondo individual. En algunos casos, estos dos sistemas compiten entre sí, 
con sus ventajas y desventajas entre ambos sistemas. Según nuestros hallazgos, el 
sistema pensional de reparto colectivo de pensiones no es sostenible en un largo plazo. 
Asimismo, sobre la base de un análisis comparativo de las ventajas y desventajas entre 
ambos sistemas, se formulan algunas recomendaciones para que los fondos privados 
de pensión (Sistema Individual) se conviertan en la mejor alternativa al sistema pen-
sional colectivo.
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1. Introduction
There have been several points of view about pension systems. For instance Piñeira (1991, 
1995) contrast Stiglitz and Orszag at al. (1999)’s point of view. The former shows that the 
private pension or Fully Funded Pension is the most suitable for governments’ budget and 
hits the best income retirement for pensioners1. The latter, points out that there is a myth 
about how a competitive framework leads to low administrative costs in a decentralized 
pension fund.2 Stiglitz claims that administrative costs of these funds are relatively high 
because of advertising expenses, loss of economies of scale and several other costs.
The private pension fund (Fully Funded System) in Chile is a system that has been 
reproduced in several countries in Latin America as well as some Western European 
countries. In addition, Chile is the only country that has private pension system (Fully 
Funded) without competing with public pensions (Pay as You Go System)3. 
This paper shed the light of comparing which system may work out better for a medium 
country in Latin America like Peru. We basically, analyze the sustainability of Pay as You 
Go System (Public Pension) versus Fully Funded Pension (Private Pension). Our hypothesis 
is that the Public Pension is unsustainable but in order to align the affiliate interests with 
the private pension institutions, we need to look for improvements in the private sector. 
The following study proposes some policies that can make Private Pension Funds more 
attractive, reliable and efficient with the highest coverage. The policies under discussion 
will permit to keep a system of retirement pension fair for affiliates without any risk 
of internal political exposure. In addition, the proposed policies may complement the 
Peruvian government attempts to enhance the private pension funds.4
1 Piñeira claims that the "Pay as You Go” comes from German Bismarck s´ system of pensions which have 
recently induced large fiscal deficits in industrialized economies. According to the author, the Fully Fund-
ed works in an environment similar to XIX century, where expectance of life is low and pyramid of popula-
tion is broader in the base. Now, after some advances in medicine and technology, the base (young) is 
not enough broad to cover the peak (retired people). Therefore fiscal imbalances may come out.
2 In Latin America, a centralized pension fund may work when the government manages the funds with the 
private sector.
3 The Fully Funded Pension is also called private pension system and the Pay as You Go System corres-
ponds to the public sector. 
4 The improvements must fill the gap between Fully Funded and Pay as You Go System. Replacement of 
Fully Funded for Pay as you Go System cannot be guaranteed without some reforms in the latter system.
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The paper is divided in the following sections: section 2, contains an assessment of the 
Private Pension under the wave of the second reform of pensions in Peru. Section 3; 
compare advantages and disadvantages between Public Pension and Private Pension. 
Section 4, discusses the sustainability of Public Pensions and finally, section 5 concludes 
and recommend some policies of improvement in private pension systems (Fully Funded 
Pension), along the line with a fiscal sustainability.
2. The Private Pension and the Second Reform in Peru
Despite that the Peruvian private pension system started 20 years ago. There are 
several challenges for the Private System (Fully Funded Pension). In 2012, the second 
reform started by hitting two main aspects in the system: Fees and Coverage. However 
the second reform may not achieve its objectives because it is under assessment in 
Peruvian courts due to possible violation of constitutional rights.
 
The second reform of private pension funds tries to lower Fees to the most competitive 
level. We have to mention that there are only four Private Pension Funds in Peru then 
the market structure is more like oligopoly. Thus, lowering fees is impossible unless it is 
regulated directly by the government. According to "Asociación Internacional de Organismos 
de Supervisión de Fondos de Pensiones (AIOS)”, the Peruvian Fee is charge over the salary 
(Fee on flow). As of December 2012, the fee on flow averages 1.83% which contrast the 
equivalent fees charged by Chile (1.77%) and Colombia (1.31%) respectively. 
Figure 1: 
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Fee on balance was applied in Chile sometime in the past and actually they use fee 
on flow plus a fixed fee. Colombia charges fee on flow and Mexico fee on balance plus 
flow. The Peruvian regulator of private pensions is attempting to reduce commissions 
by charging a fee on balance.5 The regulator argument is that during a given lifetime 
individual´ s contribution, the charges is lower at the beginning and higher at the end. 
However, for Bernal (2008) the fee on flow and fee on balance can be equivalent each 
other. There should be an illusion of “dropping fees” because at the end the individual 
contributor will pay the same amount over their working lifetime.6 
The other aspect to be challenge by the second reform in Peru is the problem of coverage 
(see figure 2). Peru faces the lowest ratios of coverage within the Latin-American region7 
(16%) which contrast the coverage of 67% and 27% achieved by Chile and Mexico 
respectively. The coverage problem is always linked to evasion (Whitehouse, 2006) 
and informality. Higher ratios of evasion and informality bring to lower coverage for the 
private pension funds. The reform attempts to incorporate independents by discounting 
them pension payments besides tax payments. However, there are more segments of 
the labor that are not considered within the reform attempt to increase the coverage.
Figure 2:
Coverage of Private Pension Funds
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5 See Bernal et al (2008) for a discussion of fees for Private Pension Funds. Also see for more details in Kay 
and Sinha (2009)
6 If you compare both payments: Fee on Balance and Fee on Flow, there is always an equivalent ratio that 
may bring both sums of fee payments over working lifetime equivalent each other.
7 The ratio considers contributors over population in age to work. See also Rofman et. Al (2008).
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Also, in order to face the problem of coverage, the government has to bring some 
population’s reliance on the private sector. After 20 years of launching the Private Pension 
Funds in Peru, there is some uncertainty between affiliates (See Moron, 2003 and Kapsoli, 
2007). The return of equity (ROE) for Peruvian Private Pensions Funds is above 20 even 
within the worst Peruvian financial period (Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros). However, 
the unreliability in the private system does not reflect the fact that the Private Pension 
Funds have made a real return of portfolio above the average in the region (see figure 3).
Figure 3:
Real Avarage Annual Return of Portfolio
(As of Dec 2012)
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The last reform of pensions has a claim for violation of constitutional rights.8 The claim 
can be summarized in the violation of constitutional rights because of two main aspects 
of the reform. First, the claim basically sustains that the Fee on Balance may trespass 
the right of “intangibility of funds.” Also, the last reform establishes a reverse auction of 
fees for new affiliates. The latter mechanism may violate the right to freely choose and it 
may incentives monopoly because the winner of the reverse auction should concentrate 
for itself the whole new affiliates for three years. The claim is under assessment by 
the Peruvian Constitutional Court. In contrast to the Mexican, Colombian and Chilean 
cases, the Peruvian constitution may not allow the establishment of the reforms that 
were described above.
8 The claim has been introduced by some fractions of the Peruvian congress.
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Next section contrast advantages and disadvantages between the two pension systems 
in Peru: the Pay as you go system (Public pension) and The Fully Funded (Private 
Pension).
3. Comparison between Pay as you Go System 
    and Fully Funded
The affiliated to Pay as You Go System (Public Pension) may achieve a minimum pension 
that is close to minimum wage. Before the Peruvian Reform for Private Pension Funds 
(2012) the Fully Funded System (Private Pension) did not have a guaranteed minimum 
pension. By looking at the “Texto Único de Procedimientos Administrativos de AFPs en 
Peru (Ley 054-97) we may verify that there is not a minimum wage granted for contributor 
whenever his contribution was not good enough to program any fixed pension over time.9
The monthly retirement Income under the Pay as you Go System is around US$ 300 
dollars which is very close to minimum wage in Peru. In contrast to Private Pension, 
the Public pension is granted for any amount of total contribution achieved by the 
contributor over his lifetime. In the private pension System, the only restriction to hit 
minimum pension is the number of years of contribution which is 20. For the private 
Pension, the restriction is only limited to the amount of money contributed without any 
limit in the number of years.
The last pension reform in Peru established that the Private Pension must have a “Solidarity 
Pension” which is very close to the minimum wage. This will permit to the Private Pension 
System to have a minimum pension like Public Pension. The new system makes the 
government to complements the affiliate’s contribution, allowing the contributor to collect 
enough funds to hit a minimum pension close to the minimum wage.10 
Therefore, after the Peruvian reform in the private pension system, there will be an 
alignment of benefits between the two pension systems: Fully Funded and Pay as You 
9 Basically the TUPA claims that if the contribution is low then the full amount of it is returned to the res-
pectively contributor. Only when the full contribution hit certain amount of money, then any program of 
payment is scheduled. Most of the time, the program of payments are close to minimum wage and above. 
10 Also, the “solidarity pension” may increase as long as the contribution gets higher and the government 
award it with higher subsidy. 
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Go. In addition, the Fully Funded System gives higher pension as long as the contribution 
gets higher. The latter situation cannot be granted by Pay as You Go System so the final 
balance of benefits tilts toward the Fully Funded System. Next section will describe the 
economic consequences of keeping the Pays as You Go System. 
4. Sustainability of Pay as You Go System
This section will analyze the sustainability of Pay as You Go System in terms of government 
expenses. Then we will compare how the “Solidarity Pension” proposed in the last reform 
may be less costly to the government. We will verify that the last option is possible for the 
Peruvian government and bring better benefits for the affiliate. 
Our statistical analysis is two folded: the public and private sector. For the private sector, 
the data is taken from Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Supervisión de Fondos 
de Pensiones (AIOS). In addition, for the public sector we employ data from the Oficina 
de Normalización Previsional (ONP). The macroeconomic data has been collected from 
Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática (INEI).
In order to analyze the public sector, the variables income and expenses are collected 
from the Oficina de Normalización Previsional (ONP). The income represents all the 
contributions made by the affiliates to ONP and the expenses means the programmed 
payments to the retired people under Public System. 
The figure below shows that the number of retired people under the ONP or Public 
Pension System hit almost half million people. This number should increase more, over 
time if we consider a scenario where the aging population increases at a rapid growth 
rate. Whenever the latter situation happens then the population pyramid gets broader 
on the peak and narrower on the base.11
11 For more about this phenomenon see Bernal, N. et al, (2008), and also Kay, Stephen J. & Sinha, Tapen 
(ed.), 2007. They describe how Peru and Latin-American Region will face an inverted population pyramid 
through 2025, similar phenomenon experienced developed countries some years ago. 
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Figure 4: 
Number of retired people under Public Pension System
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The figure below shows the possible evolution of the population pyramid where there is a 
significant increase in the number of affiliates to the Public Pension System. It basically 
has been going from 558,144 affiliates to 1´ 304,569 affiliates which are eventually 
registered in 2012. This represents an increase of 133% within 17 years. It means that 
in average, we may expect for every year an increase of 19% of affiliates to ONP or Public 
Pension System 
Figure 5
Evolution of affiliates in the Public Pension System
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In order to find out the sustainability of the Pay as You Go System we have collected the 
data from CEPAL which forecast for 2050, a population of 42 million people in Peru, 
which represent an increase of 50% for an horizon of 38 years. 
 
The composition of the projected new population in 2050 is different to the actual 
composition of population. There will be elderly people in 2050. The latter fact can be 
explained because of the new advances in medicine and technology as well as incentives 
to reduce the number of sons for a better quality of life. This phenomenon has occurred 
already quickly in some countries like Chile and Argentina, which is the same situation 
that USA and Western European countries are experiencing. 
 
The last phenomenon has being analyzed deeply in countries like USA. It received 
the name of “baby boomer”. The fact that there is some change in the birth rate has 
been explained by Lusardi and Mitchell12 (2007) who found that certain cohort gets to 
retirement wealthier because they are able to plan in advance financially much better 
than their peers. The financial planning includes the choice of the number of kids that 
matches their financial requirements.
 
Along the line of previous analysis we have forecast what the ONP’s income and expenses 
will be within the next 38 years. The forecast of population made by CEPAL is an input to 
start up building the numbers. CEPAL is able to give the distribution of ages for the next 
38 years. The latter data permit us to build up the forecast of expenses for the Public 
Pension System. The details of population forecast made by CEPAL permit us to infer 
what the number of retirements will be under the Public Sector. We assume that the 
retirement coverage of pension will progressively go from 29% to 46% of the population 
within retirement age.
We assume that 3% of Peruvian GDP is collected in the Public Pension System.13 The 
real growth rate of GDP14 is assumed to be 3% flat and the deflator grows at a constant 
ratio of 1%. The latter data permit us to build up the income for Public Sector System. 
12 They used Data for the USA and the same situation occurs in Western European countries.
13 During past periods this ratio was the average of income as share of GDP. We assume that the ratio re-
mains the same for the next 38 years of forecast.
14 At the beginning the growth of GDP is 6% until 2015 then the growth will be constant at 3% until 2050. 
The latter situation is explained because of decreasing return to scale within a medium country like Peru. 
Similar forecast has been revised by IMF and World Bank.
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The figure below summarizes the simulation of results for Public Pension System’s 
income and expenses over the next 38 years. We can see that there is a gap between 
income and expenses because the number of contributors does not fill the retirements. 
Even today there is a gap of 3000 million dollars. If we add all the gaps over the period 
of forecast and assume the same coverage and ratio of real growth of GDP then the 
outstanding debt for pension will be 30% of the Peruvian real GDP.15 
Figure 6
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Taking into account that the country is export oriented to commodities then the fiscal 
sustainability is under exposure. Therefore, Peruvian external vulnerabilities may be 
deepened whenever there is a scenario where international interest rates will jump to 
level of 80 s´.16 The only possibility to avoid any possible fiscal vulnerability is to close the 
gap in the Public Pension System. 
Chile is the only country with the private sector of pensions working alone. In most of 
the countries in the Latin American region both systems coexist: Fully Funded (Private 
15 The situation is similar to the fiscal problems in Europe and USA. This will be the Peruvian baby boomers 
that the local economy will face. 
16 USA and European countries have more internal debt than external. In case of Peru, as many Latin Ame-
rica countries, the debt is more external so the exposure to international interest rate is likely.
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Pension) and Pays as You Go System (Public Pension). The possibility to have a Private 
Pension System with a solidarity pension could fill the forgone benefits of missing the 
unsustainable Public Pension System.
The Table below introduces some calculations that consider a scenario of Private Pension 
System with Pension Solidarity. The government will face payments that represent 0.15% 
of GDP for 2050. This is a cheaper option instead of having a Public Pension System that 
may trigger a fiscal vulnerability in the Peruvian economy. 
In order to make our analysis comparable to the former, we assume the same level of 
coverage that we did for the later simulation (around 29%). The level of government 
assistance may increase as long as the coverage rises. Also, to capture the people that 
need government assistance, we employ the data from “Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
del Peru” which is published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informatica (INEI). 
After having the coverage and the people under assistance, we have made some 
simulations for different level of pensions. Basically government expenditure is cheaper 
in an scenario of Private Pension System working alone with Solidarity Pension17.
5. Conclusions
We have found that Peruvian Pay as You Go system (Public Pension) may be unsustainable 
over time. Similar case experienced some Western European countries as well as The 
United States of America. 
The fiscal unsustainability may be triggered shortly if we consider a negative shock in 
commodities plus increases in international interest rates. The Peruvian economy is still 
dependent on external variables, so there has to be some actions to close the gaps in 
the “Pay as You Go System.”
By closing the Pay as You Go System, the unsustainability of the Peruvian Public Pension 
System disappears. However, to fill the gap of benefits that the private system may forgone 
is to introduce the “solidarity pension” which works perfectly in Chile and Colombia. 
17 Restrepo and Gutierrez (2011) found that higher density help to reduce the government intervention and 
guarantees a minimum pension. 
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Table 1
Impact of Solidarity Pension
Solidarity 
Pension
Source
Private 
Contribution
Public 
Contribution
2050 
2/
Government Support Private 1/
Mill. 
Soles
% GDP
Mill. 
Soles
% GDP % GDP
S/. 250
None Tax of 5% on Income 341 0.08% 0 0% 0%
Government Support Tax of 5% on Income 170 0.04% 170 0.04% 0.03%
Government Support Tax of 5% on Income 85 0.02% 255 0.87% 0.04%
Government Support None 0 0.00% 341 0.89% 0.06%
S/. 350
None Tax of 5% on Income 477 0.11% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Government Support Tax of 5% on Income 239 0.05% 239 0.05% 0.04%
Government Support Tax of 5% on Income 119 0.03% 358 0.08% 0.06%
Government Support None 0 0.00% 477 0.11% 0.08%
S/. 675
None Tax of 5% on Income 920 0.21% 0 0.00% 0.00%
Government Support Tax of 5% on Income 460 0.10% 460 0.10% 0.08%
Government Support Tax of 5% on Income 230 0.05% 690 0.16% 0.11%
Government Support None 0 0.00% 920 0.21% 0.15%
1/ Include the pyramid population effect over time
2/ We assume that the government expenditure may drop if we include a tax from private sector 
that support the solidarity pension
An interesting further research may be to compare the Peruvian constitution against 
Colombian and Chilean constitution. The latter comparison will permit to find out why there 
is only a possible violation of Peruvian constitutional rights during the implementation of 
any reform that attempts to lower commissions and increase the coverage.
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